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HusBAND AND WIFE-RIGHT OF WIFE TO SUE FOR Loss OF CONSORTIUM
DUE TO NEGLIGENT INJURY TO HUSBAND-Plaintiff brought an action for
loss of consortium with her husband, allegedly due to defendant's negligent
injury of the husband. In a prior suit the husband's cause of action
against the defendant had been settled and dismissed with prejudice.
The trial court dismissed the present suit for failure to state a cause of
action. On appeal, held, reversed. The wife has a valuable property
right of consortium. Iowa statutes pertaining to the rights of married
women1 clearly indicate the intent of the legislature to remove the common law bar of coverture that prevented a wife from maintaining an
action for loss of consortium. Acuff v. Schmit, (Iowa 1956) 78 N. W. (2d)
480.
It has long been the rule at common law2 and has been held under modern
statutes3 that negligent injury of the husband gives the wife no cause of ac-

1 Iowa Code Ann. (1950) §§597.1, 597.18, 613.11. Every state has adopted statutes,
popularly known as married women's acts, which modify the harsh common law rules
relating to the status of wives.
2 Sobolewski v. German, 32 Del. (2 W. W. Harr.) 540, 127 A. 49 (1924). See collection of authorities in 5 A.L.R. 1049 (1920); 59 A.L.R. 680 (1929).
3 Cravens v. Louisville&: N. R. Co., 195 Ky. 2o7, 242 S.W. 628 (1922); Feneff v. New
York Central &: H. R. R. Co., 203 Mass. 278, 89 N.E. 436 (1909).
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tion for her loss of consortium. Most courts permit the husband, however,
to recover for his loss of consortium.4 The roots of this distinction can
be traced to the common law concept of husband and wife as a single
legal entity. Only the husband could sue for an interference with the
marital relation, and to recover for her own personal injuries the wife
had to sue jointly with the husband.5 Initially, the husband's recovery
for loss of consortium was limited to the value of the wife's services and
society. 6 Once such a loss was proved, recovery could be ex.tended to
the more intangible elements7 of the marital relationship. Inasmuch as
the wife had no right to the services of the husband,8 the courts rationally denied her substantive cause of action for loss of her consortium.
The married women's acts have removed the common law disability of
coverture from the wife and give her the right to sue in tort.9 The courts
have not -construed this legislation so as to give her a cause of action
generally for loss of consortium.10 Many courts, viewing the spirit of
the legislation, have taken a half-step in this direction, however, by permitting the wife to maintain such an action when the conduct producing
the injury to consortium is intentional or malicious.1 1 It is difficult to
determine why the courts would ex.tend her rights this far,12 but stop

4 Tomme v. Pullman Co., 207 Ala. 511, 93 S. 462 (1922); Hansen v. Costello, 125 Conn.
386, 5 A. (2d) 880 (1939).
5 MADDEN, DOMESTIC RELATIONS §54, p. 156 (1931). Any judgment recovered could
be kept by the husband as his own, since he was entitled to the wife's chattels that he
reduced to his possession.
6 Hall v. Hollander, 4 B. & C. 660, 107 Eng. Rep. 1206 (1825). Services were broadly
defined to include her general usefulness, industry, frugality and attentions in the home.
The cases are in conflict as to whether the loss of sexual relations was an element of
society. See McCORMICK, DAMAGES §92, p. 331 (1935). It appears that the foundation
of the husband's right of action was originally based on the idea that his wife was his
servant and interference with the service of a servant was an actionable trespass. See
Lippman, "The Breakdown of Consortium," 30 COL. L. R.Ev. 651 at 653 (1930).
7 These elements are frequently described as the "sentimental version" of consortium.
See principal case at 482. See also note I supra.
s Blackstone summed it up as follows: ". . . [T]he inferior hath no kind of property in the company, care, or assistance of the superior as the superior is held to have
in those of the inferior. . . ." 3 BLACKST. COMM. "143.
9 MADDEN, DOMESTIC RELATIONS §55, p. 159 (1931).
10 Nash v. Mobile & 0. R. Co., 149 Miss. 823, 116 S. 100 (1928); Howard v. Verdigris
Valley Electric Co-op., 201 Okla. 504, 207 P. (2d) 784 (1949).
11 Flandermeyer v. Cooper, 85 Ohio St. 327, 98 N.E. 102 (1912) (defendant sold a
habit-forming drug to the husband); Roberts v. Roberts, 230 Ky. 165, 18 S.W. (2d) 981
(1929) (criminal conversation); Rott v. Goehring, 33 N.D. 413, 157 N.W. 294 (1916)
(alienation of affections); Clark v. Hill, 69 Mo. App. 541 (1897) (defendant drove the
husband to insanity by willful threats); Pratt v. Daly, 55 Ariz. 535, 104 P. (2d) 147 (1940)
(sale of intoxicants to the husband despite wife's protests).
12 The wife's right to recovery when the injury is intentionally inflicted has been
explained as resting on the necessity of punishing the wrongdoer. The husband is clearly
disqualified from bringing suit because of his participation in the act complained of, so,
of necessity, the wife must have the right. Brown v. Kistleman, 177 Ind. 692, 98 N.E.
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short of giving her a recovery against unintentional injury. A few courts,
recognizing this inconsistency, have equalized the rights of husband and
wife, with dubious justice, by denying the husband a right to recover.is
The reasons most often advanced to justify denying the wife a cause of
action for loss of consortium are a lack of statutory authorization, the
difficulty of measuring her damages because they are indirect and inconsequential, and a fear of double recovery.14 Despite the absence of
specific legislative authority, it is evident that the married women's acts
were intended to place husband and wife in positions of legal equality.
The very purpose of the legislation is thwarted by denying her the
identical rights enjoyed by the husband.15 The argument that her damages are remote, indirect and difficult to measure is sharply contradicted
by numerous decisions allowing the husband to recover for similar injuries.16 The problem of double recovery can be removed by taking into account the compensation received by the husband in his action.1 7 It
is not rational to deny the wife's claim1S for her separate injuries because of a fear they will duplicate her husband's recovery in his action
for negligent injury. To so hold would approach a return to the longdiscarded common law principle that the husband alone has the primary
right in the marital relation and he and the wife are but one legal entity. The decision in the principal case, though not without significant
precedent,19 is a bold step forward in the ultimate renunciation of a wellentrenched but vulnerable rule. It is to be hoped that the criticism of

631 (1912); Kosciolek v. Portland Ry. Light & Power Co., 81 Ore. 517, 160 P. 132 (1916).
Nevertheless, it must be remembered that a court cannot award punitive damages in a
civil action except as incidental to an actionable civil wrong. McCORMICK, DAMAGES §83,
p. 293 (1935). See also Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., (D.C. Cir. 1950) 183 F. (2d) 811 at 814,
cert. den. 340 U.S. 852 (1950. [The overruling of this case in Smither & Co. v. Coles, (D.C.
Cir., Feb. 21, 1957) left undisturbed the point here in question.]
13 Taylor v. S. H. Kress & Co., 136 Kan. 155, 12 P. (2d) 808 (1932); Helmstetler v.
Duke Power Co., 224 N.C. 821, 32 S.E. (2d) 611 (1945); Floyd v. Miller, 190 Va. 303, 57
S.E. (2d) 114 (1950).
14 Many courts have agreed with the logic of the decision in the principal case, but
feel it is only proper for the legislature to grant the right. Jeune v. Del E. Webb Const.
Co., 77 Ariz. 226, 269 P. (2d) 723 (1954); Franzen v. Zimmerman, 127 Colo. 381, 256 P.
(2d) 897 (1953); Nelson v. A. M. Lockett Co., 206 Okla. 334, 243 P. (2d) 719 (1952).
15 See principal case at pp. 484-485.
16 See note 5 supra. The injury to tlxe wife has been assessed when the conduct
producing it was intentional. Note 13 supra.
17 PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS, 2d ed., §104, p. 704 (1955).
18 Dean Pound concludes that tlxe wife's suit is not secured because of tlxe crude
method of assessing damages. See Pound, "Individual Interests in the Domestic Relations," 14 MICH. L. R.Ev. 177 at 194 (1916).
19 Hitaffer v. Argonne, note 13 supra; Hipp v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.,
182 N.C. 9, 108 S.E. 318 (1921) [whiclI was later overruled, however, in Hinnant v.
Tidewater Power Co., 189 N.C. 120, 126 S.E. 307 (1925)].
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legal writers2 0 and dissenting judges21 has finally had a telling effect on
a discriminatory rule, commendable only for its age and habit of judicial
recognition.

James M. Porter, S. Ed.

20 Lippman, "The Breakdown of Consortium," 30 CoL. L. REv. 651 (1930); Holbrook,
"The Change in the Meaning of C_onsortium," 22 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1923); Kinnaird,
"Right of Wife to Sue for Loss of Consortium Due to a Negligent Injury to Her Husband,"
35 KY. L. J. 220 (1947); PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS, 2d ed., §104, p. 704 (1955); HARPER,
LAW OF TORTS, §259, p. 566 (1933).
21 Bernhardt v. Perry, 276 Mo. 612 at 632, 208 S.W. 462 (1919); Landwehr v. Barbas,
241 App. Div. 769, 270 N.Y.S. 534 (1934) (dissent of Scudder, J.); McDade v. West, 80
Ga. App. 481 at 484, 56 S.E. (2d) 299 (1949).

